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The passage of the Uruguay Round implementing legislation represents a natural opportunity 
to review the policy goals of the U.S. import trade laws, to assess how well current laws 
achieve those objectives, and to explore possible reforms. I argue that there is a variety of 
policy concerns justifying a circumscribed set of import trade statuses. The relevant U.S. laws, 
however, have largely become divorced from such national welfare considerations and are now 
too often a mechanism for furtive protectionism. The Uruguay Round effected some (marginal) 
improvements but left the fundamental structure of the laws unchanged. I discuss possible 
reforms in the final section of the paper. 
1. Introduction 
As import tariffs have fallen across the world, nontariff barriers have become more im- 
portant impediments to trade. The use of unfair trade laws, in particular, has increased dramat- 
ically over the past two decades-undoubtedly much more dramatically than any increase in 
unfair trade itself. In the United States, for example, 233 antidumping cases were investigated 
between 1968 and 1978, whereas almost twice that number (451 cases) were investigated be- 
tween 1980 and 1989.1 Unfair trade laws are also being used more frequently abroad: Figure 1 
shows the number of antidumping cases filed by non-U.S. GATT participants since 1980 (note 
the apparent counter-cyclical pattern of the series).2 
In December 1994, President Clinton signed the Uruguay Round implementing legisla- 
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'See Dale (1980, Appendix 3, p. 204) and Boltuck and Litan (1991, Table 1-1, p. 2). The discrepancy obtains despite 
the difference in time intervals (the first figure covers an 11-year period, whereas the second figure covers a 10-year 
period). Adjusting for the increased volume of merchandise imports during the later period attenuates, but does not 
eliminate, the increase. In the earlier period, 11.9 cases were investigated for every $100 billion (1987 dollars) of 
merchandise imports. In the later period, 13.2 cases were investigated for every $100 billion of merchandise imports. 
Thus, if unfair imports are assumed to be a constant proportion of total merchandise imports, there was still a significant 
increase in the use of antidumping procedures, even after accounting for the increased incidence of unfair trade. 
2 Figure 1 depicts the total number of antidumping cases reported to the GATT Committee on Antidumping Practices 
minus the number reported by the U.S. Only signatories to the antidumping code within the GATT are required to file 
such reports, and many countries (including many GATT Contracting Parties) are not signatories. In addition, some 
signatories (e.g., the European Union) do not report some cases filed against nonsignatories. The figures presented thus 
represent a lower bound on the total number of antidumping cases filed outside the U.S. Sources: For 1980 through 
1988, U.S. General Accounting Office (1990, p. 16). For 1989 through 1993, compilations based on GATT reports. 
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Figure 1. Antidumping Cases Filed (Non-U.S. GATT Signatories) 
tion-the culmination of the eighth round of international negotiations under the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The conclusion of the Uruguay Round seems an appropriate 
occasion to review the policy goals of our import trade statutes,3 to assess how well our current 
laws achieve those objectives, and to explore future courses of action. This paper is therefore 
organized into four sections: Section 2 discusses the appropriate policy objectives of our import 
trade laws, section 3 describes the operation of our pre-Uruguay Round statutes, section 4 
explores some of the changes effected by the Uruguay Round, and section 5 examines possible 
directions for future policies.4 
2. What Are the Proper Policy Objectives of Import Trade Laws? 
A well-designed set of import trade laws would address at least three crucial economic 
policy concerns: dumping, foreign export subsidies, and import surges.5 This section will discuss 
such concerns and their impact on national economic welfare. 
Dumping 
Dumping is conventionally defined as a type of international price discrimination: the sale 
of goods within the United States at a price lower than in some foreign market.6 Ironically, 
viewed from a static perspective, laws proscribing such international price discrimination pre- 
vent behavior beneficial to the U.S. and condone behavior detrimental to the U.S. Consider the 
3 The unfair import trade laws are a subset of the import trade laws: The import surge law, for example, does not purport 
to address unfair trade. 
4 In order to focus the discussion, we will concentrate on those laws aimed at restraining unfair import trade; laws that 
can result in import restraints but that are primarily aimed at removing impediments to exports-such as Section 301 
will be discussed only tangentially. For a thorough examination of Section 301, see Bayard and Elliot (1994). We will 
also exclude laws dealing exclusively with agricultural concerns (e.g., Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act) 
or environmental issues (e.g., the Pelly Amendment). 
5 There may be other justifiable policy concerns, like national defense objectives, but they lie outside the purview of this 
analysis. 
6 For a relatively early analysis of dumping, see Viner's (1923) seminal work. He advocates the definition given in the 
text. 
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example of a monopolistic foreign firm. If there are barriers to trade that facilitate price dis- 
crimination, our static welfare is maximized if the foreign firm discriminates when our demand 
is relatively elastic and does not discriminate when our demand is relatively inelastic. (Under 
conventional assumptions, the price charged to U.S. consumers would be lower than a single 
pooled price if our demand is more elastic than foreign demand. It would be higher than a 
pooled price if our demand is less elastic than foreign demand.) But antidumping laws prohibit 
price discrimination in the first case and not in the second-exactly the opposite of what our 
optimal policy should be! Even in more complicated static cases (for example, oligopolistic 
competition) with domestic producers, dumping is still frequently welfare-improving.7 
From a static perspective, then, dumping by foreign firms frequently seems to make us 
better off. But there are two reasons to be wary of the predictions of the static perspective and 
thus two legitimate reasons for policymakers to worry about dumping: predatory pricing and 
new trade theory effects. 
Predatory Pricing 
Economists have long recognized the possible welfare losses caused by predatory pricing, 
in which a firm intentionally drives down the market price in order to force other firms out of 
the market.8 Compared to the counterfactual of no predatory behavior, consumer surplus is 
higher during the predation period (since the price is lower) but then lower in the subsequent 
period (since, if the predation is successful, market power and the price are higher). After 
discounting and integrating appropriately, it is certainly possible that consumer surplus will be 
reduced by predation. Does economic theory offer policymakers any guidance in assessing the 
likelihood of such losses? 
The theory of predatory pricing has evolved substantially over the past decade.9 The older 
Chicago view is that predatory pricing is unlikely to occur, largely because in most situations 
it is implausible for firms to expect such a strategy to generate positive (discounted) profits. 
According to this view, the predation period may have to be relatively prolonged and costly. 
Entry during the later period, furthermore, is likely to dissipate any incipient rents. The impli- 
cation is that predatory pricing is rarely a profitable activity and therefore should rarely be 
observed. New developments in industrial organization theory, however, suggest a somewhat 
less sanguine perspective: They posit a variety of ways in which predators can prevent entry 
and thus protect the rents accruing during the second stage. The strategic entry deterrence 
literature, for example, presents models with irreversible investment, in which firms can deter 
entry by building excess capacity or investing in advertising. Such activities can be expensive, 
but they may make predatory pricing a profitable strategy by protecting the second period rents. 
Alternatively, predatory pricing itself can be a deterrent to entry: Such behavior may create a 
reputation for craziness and irrational behavior, and this reputation may dissuade potential rivals 
7 See, for example, Brander and Krugman (1983). In general, a domestic welfare gain from foreign dumping may be 
more likely if we are net importers of the product. In partial equilibrium, the net import assumption ensures that the 
consumer surplus gain from a lower price dominates the domestic producer surplus loss in the market for the imported 
good. But matters are more complicated once other markets are included in the analysis (assuming nonseparability of 
utility across commodities) and in a dynamic context. 
8 Such concerns are only germane in an imperfectly competitive environment: Within a perfectly competitive world, 
antitrust issues are obviated because free entry obtains by assumption (ensuring zero profits in equilibrium). 
9 For an overview, see, for example, Baker (1989). 
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from entering in the later period. Either way, a predatory pricing strategy may be more attractive 
to firms than the Chicago view would suggest. 
If predatory pricing actually occurs, a foreign predator may reduce domestic welfare more 
than a domestic predator ceteris paribus for at least two reasons.10 First, a predatory strategy 
will be adopted only if it generates expected discounted profits in excess of the cost of exercising 
the option to undertake the predation."l Thus, monopolization of a domestic market by a foreign 
producer creates an expected domestic welfare loss both from the deadweight loss (as in purely 
domestic cases) and from the expected present discounted value of the differential profits ac- 
cruing from the strategy, which represent an expected transfer of rents from domestic consumers 
to the foreign producer. Second, labor is usually thought to be relatively mobile within a 
country-especially in the United States-but relatively immobile between countries. If workers 
in the firm that is attacked have skills specific to the industry, the transfer of production to the 
predator firm generates more domestic dislocation (in terms of unemployment mismatch) if the 
expanded production occurs abroad rather than at home. This seems more likely if the predator 
is a foreign firm rather than a domestic one. 
Predatory dumping may thus be a legitimate policy concern. But it is important to note 
that dumping, as conventionally defined, is neither necessary nor sufficient for predation in 
practice. Predation can occur even if the price is higher in the U.S. than abroad (if the U.S. 
price, for example, would have been even higher, relative to the foreign price, in the absence 
of the predatory behavior). And price discrimination across national boundaries can be nonpred- 
atory (if, for example, elasticities of demand for a firm's product vary across countries). To 
foreshadow the discussion in section 3, I should also stress that a U.S. price below the foreign 
exporter's average cost is neither necessary nor sufficient for predation. Predation is possible 
even if the price is above the predator's average cost (if, for example, the price is below both 
the prey's marginal cost and the predator's short-run profit-maximizing price'2). And prices 
below average cost-or even below short-run marginal cost-are not prima facie evidence of 
predation (see section 3). 
New Trade Theory Effects 
The new trade theory suggests that there may be a limited number of cases, involving 
some sort of nonconvexity and imperfect competition, in which protection of the home market 
affords a firm first-mover advantages, facilitates dynamic learning effects, or generates other 
benefits.l3 I should note, however, that it is not obvious that outright protection of the home 
market, as opposed to subsidization, actually bestows any new trade theory advantages on 
10 This does not necessarily suggest that policymakers should be disproportionately concerned about international cases, 
however. The presence of a foreign producer in the market may indicate that the environment is less conducive to a 
successful predatory strategy, thus invalidating the ceteris paribus assumption above, if, for example, it indicates that 
entry by other foreign producers is relatively easy in the particular market (i.e., because import barriers are low). In 
other words, international predation may be both more deleterious and less likely. 
" Predation is an irreversible investment undertaken in an environment of uncertainty and thus has an option value that 
must be accounted for in the firm's predatory strategy. For an introduction to the options approach to irreversible 
investment under uncertainty, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
12 In this example, there are efficiency benefits to the predation process (the predator's marginal cost is below the prey's 
marginal cost, assuming the predator's marginal cost is no higher than her average cost). But these efficiency benefits 
must be compared to the distortions induced by the predator's increased market power in order to reach a conclusion 
as to whether the predation increases social welfare. 
13 For basic introductions to the new trade theory, see Krugman (1986) and Helpman and Krugman (1989, Chapter 5). 
406 Joseph E. Stiglitz 
domestic firms. Under a protectionist policy, the domestic firm obtains a larger share of a smaller 
market (assuming a downward-sloping domestic demand curve). Whether or not protection 
produces new trade theory benefits for the domestic firm thus depends on the specific form of 
the relevant new trade theory effect, the effectiveness of the protection in excluding foreign 
firms, and product demand parameters (see Brander and Spencer 1984; Krugman 1984). 
Protectionism may not produce new trade theory benefits in all industries, but the potential 
gains in some industries raise complex policy questions. In particular, in a new trade theory 
world, the strong (conventional) form of predation must be supplemented by a weak form of 
predation, in which the foreigner's objective is to acquire or appropriate rents from domestic 
firms rather than to drive them out of business.14 The weak form of predation suggests that 
antidumping laws could potentially boost national welfare either by allowing domestic firms to 
gain new trade theory advantages or by preventing foreign firms from obtaining them. 
Foreign Export Subsidies 
In the majority of cases, it is in our national interest to welcome subsidized exports from 
other countries. Such subsidized exports most frequently occur in industries in which we are 
net importers so, at least from a partial equilibrium analysis of the market for the imported 
good, the consumer surplus gain from any price decline exceeds the producer surplus loss.15 
Thus, economists often argue that we should be grateful for the gift, perhaps even sending a 
"thank-you note," as one trade scholar glibly put it (Jackson 1989, p. 251; also see Dixit 1987). 
But there are two reasons to temper our general enthusiasm for subsidized imports: the new 
trade theory (again) and global welfare maximization. 
New Trade Theory Effects 
The new trade theory suggests that there may be some cases in which export subsidization 
could raise national welfare and reduce welfare in the importing country (Brander and Spencer 
1985). In this case, countervailing duty laws (which countervail subsidies that promote exports) 
can be useful in preventing foreign firms from gaining a first-mover advantage. Similarly, mul- 
tilateral disciplines and foreign countervailing duty laws can mitigate the incentives for us to 
try to gain such an advantage. 
Global Welfare Effects 
Even within the conventional paradigm of perfectly competitive markets, the existence of 
countervailing duty laws could be beneficial from a global welfare perspective. Such laws 
attempt to counteract the effects of export subsidies and thus may dissuade misguided policy- 
makers from granting the subsidies in the first place.16 Put another way, subsidies that distort 
the trade flows consistent with comparative advantage reduce global welfare (again, assuming 
14 In a Cournot model, for example, a reduction in one firm's marginal cost can result in an increase in its share of the 
market, even though the second firm does not vanish. So if the foreign firm's marginal cost is reduced because of new 
trade theory effects, it can capture a larger share of the rents in the market even if it does not drive the domestic firm 
out of business. 
15 From a different but equivalent partial equilibrium perspective, our terms of trade improve. In general equilibrium, the 
impact on social welfare may be more complicated (e.g., if utility functions are not separable across commodities and 
if cross-elasticities are significant). 
16 The laws may also discourage rent-seeking behavior from firms eager for the subsidies. 
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a perfectly competitive world). Countervailing duty laws may be useful in discouraging such 
behavior. The problem is that the U.S. has to threaten to shoot itself in the foot in order to 
ensure that others do not shoot themselves in their respective feet. We can only hope that the 
threat is credible enough that we will not have to execute it (and hence ourselves). 
A final subtlety concerning countervailing duties is the treatment of externalities. Global 
welfare may be boosted by government subsidies that encourage activities with positive exter- 
nalities (e.g., research and development [R&D] and other activities). And to the extent that the 
externalities cross national boundaries, our national welfare may be raised by foreign govern- 
ment subsidies. So there is some motivation for exempting R&D and other similar subsidies 
from the countervailing duty laws. At the same time, however, it is often difficult in practice 
to distinguish a production subsidy from an R&D subsidy. This is the rationale for the treatment 
of R&D subsidies in the Uruguay Round agreement (see section 4): They are protected from 
countervailing duties, i.e., are green-lighted, but there are limits on what qualifies as an R&D 
subsidy. 
Import Surges 
With large adjustment costs and some form of market failure (for example, capital market 
imperfections), it may be in the national interest for the government to provide a means of 
smoothing adjustment to very large but temporary trade shocks, basically as a type of insurance 
policy, even though such shocks do not represent unfair trade.17 The problem with this kind of 
policy is that it is not possible to discern whether a given shock is temporary or permanent 
until well after the shock has hit. Since policies that impede adjustment to permanent shocks 
are likely to be welfare-reducing, the optimal market surge policy must compare the (potential) 
benefits of providing insurance against temporary surges to the (probable) costs of preventing 
or delaying required adjustments to permanent shocks. 
Whether or not the market surge laws provide a direct economic net benefit to the country, 
they can be supported on political economy grounds. Some level of insurance seems to be 
necessary to make a free trade regime politically acceptable, and thus a market surge protection 
law may be required to obtain the overall benefits of a liberal trading regime. The GATT 
recognizes this reality in Article XIX, which allows safeguards to be imposed if unanticipated 
increases in imports inflict serious injury on a domestic industry. 
3. The Pre-Uruguay Round Trade Laws 
The U.S. has an elaborate and comprehensive system of trade laws, many of which are 
referred to by their statutory numbers. Sections 201 and 406 address market surges,18 Section 
232 regulates imports that threaten national security, Section 301 deals with foreign trade bar- 
riers and violations of trade agreements, Section 337 addresses unlawful marketing of imports 
(such as infringements of patents), Section 701 governs countervailing duties, and Section 731 
17 Available derivatives markets are not sufficient to hedge against large import surges. 
18 The import surge laws are often referred to as escape clauses or safeguard statutes. But import surge laws seems to be 
the most accurate description of their substance. 
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is the antidumping statute.19 My focus here will be the antidumping, countervailing duty, and 
market surge laws. I will also discuss Section 337 briefly. 
Antidumping Laws 
The current antidumping process has two parts: a dumping component and an injury com- 
ponent. Under the dumping part of the process, the Department of Commerce compares the 
price in the U.S. to a so-called foreign market value; the dumping margin is then simply the 
difference between the foreign market value and the U.S. price. Under the injury part, the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) determines whether the imports are causing or threatening 
material injury to the U.S. industry. (This injury standard is substantially weaker than in the 
import surge laws.) Both dumping and injury must be found for final duties to be imposed, and 
relief must be granted if both findings are positive. 
Unfortunately, our antidumping laws no longer have much to do with the prevention of 
the strong form of predatory pricing.20 Our first antidumping statute-the Antidumping Act of 
1916-was clearly aimed at preventing international predatory pricing.21 But since the 1921 
Antidumping Act, it has not been necessary to demonstrate predatory intent or effect, so any 
international price discrimination (whether predatory or not) in which the U.S. price is lower 
than the foreign price has been proscribed.22 
Since the 1974 trade act, the focus of the antidumping laws has shifted from preventing 
price discrimination to preventing sales below fully allocated average cost.23 The mechanism 
driving this result is buried deep in the trade statutes. The law defines a hierarchy of methods 
for determining the foreign market value of a good: the home market index (the price at which 
the good is sold in the exporter's home market), the third country index (the price at which the 
good is sold in another of the exporter's foreign markets), and, only as a last resort, constructed 
value (an estimate of the exporter's average cost).24 This hierarchy seems somewhat reasonable. 
But the law also stipulates that sales below total cost must be disregarded when calculating the 
first two indices if such sales have been made "over an extended period of time and in sub- 
stantial quantities, and are not at prices which permit recovery of all costs within a reasonable 
period of time in the normal course of trade" (Committee on Ways and Means 1993, p. 388). 
19 For some reason, the antidumping and countervailing duty laws are not usually referred to by their section numbers. 
20 In the discussion below, all references to predatory pricing and predation refer to the strong form, that is, to price 
reductions intended to drive other firms out of the market. 
21 The law included a requirement that the dumping had to "be done with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry 
in the United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or 
monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States" (Committee on Ways and Means 
1993, p. 417). 
22 The legislative history of the 1921 Act suggests that, despite the formal language of the law, the prevention of predatory 
pricing was still its primary objective. As the committee report states, the Act "protects our industries and labor against 
a now common species of commercial warfare of dumping goods ... until our industries are destroyed, whereupon the 
dumping ceases and prices are raised at above former levels to recoup dumping losses" (quoted in Dale 1980, p. 12). 
See also Nivola (1993, p. 31). 
23 Congressional hearings held in 1968 to consider the Kennedy Round antidumping codes clearly indicate that protag- 
onists then viewed the prevention of price discrimination as the primary objective of the antidumping laws. In his 
opening statement, for example, Senator Russell Long is quoted as saying, "The Antidumping Act ... is designed to 
protect against the rankest kind of commercial injustice-price discrimination by foreign competitors ..." (emphasis 
added) (Committee on Finance 1968, p. 1). See also Cass and Narkin (1991, pp. 208-212). 
24 The methodology used in cases involving nonmarket economies is different. 
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In practice, so many observations are excluded because of this provision that foreign market 
value must often be calculated using the constructed value index.25 
Prohibiting sales below average total cost precludes many perfectly rational and nonpred- 
atory activities.26 For example, economists have long recognized that profit-maximizing firms 
may have sales below average total cost but above average variable cost in the short run. 
Furthermore, as Spence (1981) and others have shown, learning curves can induce firms to 
forward price at expected long-run marginal cost rather than short-run marginal cost, so prices 
below current marginal cost (and current average cost) do not necessarily imply that predatory 
behavior is occurring.27 And newer theories suggest other motivations, such as those generated 
by irreversible investments, for profit-maximizing firms to price below average variable cost 
over some (perhaps relatively extended) periods.28 
The pre-Uruguay Round antidumping statutes contained a legion of other serious biases, 
some of which were partially addressed by the Round (see section 3).29 For example, individual 
transactions in the U.S. were compared to averages abroad and negative dumping margins were 
counted as zero, so any dispersion in the time series of prices produced a positive dumping 
finding, even if there was no dumping on a transaction-by-transaction basis.30 In addition, the 
laws imposed minimum rates for profit (8%) and overhead (10%), regardless of the firm's actual 
profit or overhead. This tended to produce a higher constructed value, and thus a higher dumping 
margin, for firms with profit or overhead rates under the minimum. And misuse of the best- 
information-available process often meant that useful information submitted by foreign exporters 
was disregarded.31 These provisions, as well as numerous others, resulted in positive dumping 
margins when no real dumping had occurred. 
25 The Commerce Department's pre-Uruguay Round methodology disregarded all foreign price data and used the con- 
structed value index if more than 90% of foreign sales were deemed to be below cost. 
26 The Areeda-Turner predatory pricing criterion recognizes that sales below average total cost are not necessarily pred- 
atory (see Areeda and Turner 1975, pp. 697-733). 
27 See Spence (1981). Spence's model assumes no uncertainty and a zero discount rate. For a discussion of learning curve 
effects with uncertainty and a positive discount rate, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 339-353). 
28 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 292-293). 
29 For more detail on many of the biases in the pre-Uruguay Round dumping laws, see the collection of essays in Boltuck 
and Litan (1991). The collection also includes an essay by an enthusiastic supporter of the statutes (see Stewart 1991, 
pp. 288-330). 
30 Suppose that sales in both the foreign market and the U.S. market occurred on two dates. On the first date, the good 
was sold for $10 in the U.S. market and for the equivalent of $10 in the foreign market. On the second date, the good 
was sold for $5 in the U.S. market and for the equivalent of $5 in the foreign market. Clearly, there was no dumping; 
the goods were sold for the same price on both occasions. But the transaction-to-average comparison process would 
nonetheless have produced a positive dumping margin: The average price for foreign sales was $7.50, so the second 
sale in the United States was dumped, with a margin of $7.50 - $5.00 = $2.50. The first sale in the U.S. had a 
dumping margin of -$2.50, so that if the two individual margins were averaged, the correct answer (zero) would be 
obtained. But instead the first dumping margin would have been set to zero, and the final average dumping margin 
would therefore have been $1.25 (=$2.50/2). 
31 A recent article in The Washington Post noted that "the administrative burden simply of furnishing the required 
information within the required time in the required form to the Department of Commerce has become so overwhelm- 
ingly difficult that more and more foreign companies are either unable or unwilling to try ... [C]ompanies of the 
stature of Matsushita, SKF, and Toshiba find compliance with the Commerce Department's demands impossible ... " 
(Thompson 1994). Not surprisingly, there is some evidence that cases that did not use information from foreign exporters 
resulted in larger dumping margins than cases that did. Baldwin and Moore (1991, Tables 701, 703) find that the 
average dumping margin for final determinations using information from foreign firms was 27.9%, whereas the average 
dumping margin for final determinations that did not use such information was 66.7%. In a pooled regression of all 
final dumping margins, the dummy variable for the lack of foreign information was positive (0.383), with a t-statistic 
of 4.19. But it is unclear whether these results are causal or merely an example of selection bias: It could be that the 
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Table 1. U.S. Antidumping Cases by Industry, 1980-1989 
Industry Number of Cases Filed 
Chemicals 58 
Food 16 
Iron and Steel 201 
Machinery 8 
Nonferrous Metals 16 
Textiles and Apparel 15 
Other 137 
Total 451 
Source: Boltuck and Litan (1991, Table 1-2, p. 3). 
Given the focus on costs and the biases in the process, a dumping finding was almost a 
foregone conclusion, especially in the capital-intensive, highly cyclical industries that account 
for the majority of dumping cases (see Table 1). As Lester Thurow has noted, if "the law were 
applied to domestic firms, eighteen out of the top twenty firms in the Fortune 500 would have 
been found guilty of dumping in 1982" (Thurow 1985, p. 359). From this perspective, it is 
perhaps not surprising that a positive dumping margin was found in over 80% of all cases that 
reached a final determination in the early and mid-1980s.32 So the dumping test often did not 
function as a binding constraint.33 
Recent research has substantiated other distortions caused by the antidumping process, 
many of which are likely to continue in the post-Uruguay Round period. As one perhaps pre- 
dictable example, empirical research has found that firms may not have to wait for a positive 
final determination in order to benefit from a dumping suit. Staiger and Wolak (1994b) report 
that "petitioning firms may enjoy import relief during the investigation period that amounts to 
about half of what they might expect from a positive final determination and duty imposition" 
(Staiger and Wolak 1994b, p. 101). There are several possible explanations for this result, 
including the retroactive calculation and imposition of duties at the end of the investigation (so 
that exporters and importers have an incentive to raise prices immediately once an investigation 
has begun) and the adverse effect of an investigation on competitive pressures within an in- 
dustry. Whatever the explanation, the result has been that the antidumping laws are becoming 
increasingly attractive to firms seeking protection against imports-and not necessarily unfair 
imports.34 
Because positive dumping margins are almost always found and because any significant 
fall in sales is sufficient for a positive injury finding (even if most of the fall in sales is caused 
by other factors), the antidumping laws are now effectively acting like market surge statutes, 
foreign firms most unfamiliar with the antidumping process or with the least incentive to comply with that process 
were also the ones with the largest dumping margins. 
32 Murray (1991, Table 2-3, p. 46). The figure applies to cases initiated after 1979 and concluded before 1986. It excludes 
cases that were terminated or suspended. According to a press report, positive determinations have been even more 
likely recently: An article in Forbes magazine alleges that dumping was found in 97% of the cases decided between 
1988 and 1992 (see Frum 1992). 
33 We should note, however, a possible selection bias: The cases in which dumping would not be found may not be 
observed as frequently because petitioners can predict the outcome and therefore a disproportionate number of such 
cases are not filed. This criticism does not seem relevant to Lester Thurow's observation. 
34 Between 1963 and 1979, U.S. firms filed 532 antidumping and countervailing duty cases and 75 import surge cases. 
Between 1980 and 1988, they filed over 700 antidumping and countervailing duty cases and just 19 import surge cases 
(Hansen and Prusa 1993, p. 35). 
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especially for moribund industries. Indeed, the laws are now sometimes referred to as the baby 
201 laws.35 This baby 201 tendency is the direct result of provisions within the import surge 
laws (like Presidential discretion, a higher injury standard, and the limited duration of remedies) 
that are intended to avert their misuse. In effect, then, the antidumping laws are functioning as 
an ersatz market surge system without the restrictions intended to prevent abuse. 
According to many analysts, the antidumping laws are indeed being abused. This is perhaps 
most apparent in the filing of harassment cases intended to impose purely temporary trade 
restraints and legal costs on foreign exporters (Staiger and Wolak 1994a). Such cases are par- 
ticularly effective because of the asymmetries in legal costs borne by domestic plaintiffs and 
foreign defendants. The current chairman of the ITC has been quoted as saying that he "can 
identify areas where there are abuses ... petitioners which use the trade laws purely as aggres- 
sive tools, rather than as a legitimate response to unfair trade practices."36 Staiger and Wolak 
(1994b, p. 100) estimate that 10 of the 338 manufactured goods cases adjudicated between 1980 
and 1985 were harassment or process cases-a small number, to be sure, but nonetheless wor- 
risome. 
In summary, the antidumping laws no longer have very much to do with the prevention 
of predatory pricing. Indeed, a recent OECD study examining U.S. dumping cases between 
1979 and 1989 concluded that conditions were not even conducive to predatory pricing in over 
85% of the cases that found dumping or that were terminated or suspended before a final 
determination.37 It is perhaps worth stressing that the prevention of predatory pricing is a more 
restrictive standard than the prevention of price discrimination, which is itself a more narrow 
concept than preventing below-cost sales. And we do not even conduct our price-to-cost com- 
parisons in an entirely disinterested manner and thus are at least three steps away from a purely 
predatory pricing rule. 
As for the possible benefits of an antidumping law within a new trade theory environment, 
Boltuck and Litan (1991, p. 11) note that "there is no evidence that the antidumping law in the 
United States or in any other country is either designed or administered in a manner to ensure 
that its application is limited to such instances." 
Countervailing Duty Laws 
The first U.S. statute to address unfair international trade was an 1897 countervailing duty 
law addressing export subsidies (Committee on Ways and Means 1993, p. 53). This statute 
remained largely unchanged between 1922 (when foreign domestic subsidies were included) 
and 1979 (when the U.S. implemented the GATT Subsidies Code, which had been negotiated 
as part of the Tokyo Round).38 The 1984 and 1988 trade acts made some other changes to the 
countervailing duty laws. 
Under the countervailing duty law, the Department of Commerce determines whether im- 
ports into the U.S. are being subsidized, and the ITC determines whether material injury results 
from such subsidized imports. (The injury test is applied only in cases against GATT signato- 
ries.) As in antidumping, the procedure tends to produce biased margins, and the injury standard 
is low. Since it is relatively easy under these laws to show that a foreign firm has been subsidized 
35 The sobriquet applies to the countervailing duty laws also (Boltuck and Litan 1991, p. 11). 
36 See Financial Times (10 August 1994). 
37 See OECD Working Party No. 1 (1994). 
38 The most important reform in 1979 was the introduction of a mandatory injury test for all signatories to the Code. 
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in some way, the countervailing duty laws have become a popular protectionist sibling to the 
antidumping laws. 
One contentious issue in countervailing duty law is the treatment of subsidies to firms that 
are subsequently privatized through auctions. It would seem to most economists that any subsidy 
granted prior to privatization would be capitalized into the privatization price. So the government 
would have been paid back, and the subsidy should not be countervailable, after privatization. 
Indeed, the Court of International Trade recently advanced such an argument.39 This issue is of 
particular importance for the economies in transition and will be discussed further below. 
Import Surge Laws 
Section 201 is the primary U.S. market surge law, and it is generally consistent with the 
stringent requirements of the GATT safeguards clause (Article XIX). In particular, Section 201 
requires that the ITC determine whether "an article is being imported into the United States in 
such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury ... to the domestic 
industry ..." (Committee on Ways and Means 1993, p. 452). If the ITC concludes that these 
requirements are satisfied, it then submits a suggested remedy to the President. The President 
has the discretion to approve the ITC's suggestion, to adopt a different remedy, or to do nothing 
at all. In making this decision, the President is instructed to evaluate whether a proposed action 
provides "greater economic and social benefits than costs." If a remedy is applied, it must be 
applied against imports from all trading partners (i.e., on a most-favored nation basis) and must 
be temporary (which is defined as anything lasting no more than eight years) (Committee on 
Ways and Means 1993, p. 464; Hansen and Prusa 1993, p. 38). Since it is much easier to obtain 
relief under the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes, Section 201 is now rarely used. 
No petitions, for example, were filed during the whole of 1993 (Office of the United States 
Trade Representative 1994, p. 105). 
Section 337 
Section 337 primarily addresses the infringement of patents, copyrights, trademarks, or 
mask works in the importation of goods into the United States (Committee on Ways and Means 
1993, p. 444). Under this statute, the ITC investigates whether a violation has occurred and, if 
it reaches a positive determination, issues a remedial order to stop the imports, an order that 
the President can overrule. In 1989, a GATT panel concluded that parts of the Section 337 
process violated the principle of national treatment because imported goods were subjected to 
a different legal system (distinct from the corresponding intellectual property rights statutes 
applying to domestically produced goods) solely on the grounds of their country of origin.40 
Nonmarket Economies 
Finally, the import trade statutes have a distinct set of procedures for so-called nonmarket 
economies (NMEs) like the countries of the former Soviet Union. The antidumping laws for 
39 The case involved the U.K.'s United Engineering Steels, a joint venture between British Steel and Guest, Keen, and 
Nettlefolds. The Court overturned Commerce's decision to countervail subsidies granted prior to privatization (see 
Financial Times 15 June 1994). This issue is of crucial importance in assessing the benefits of the transfer of non- 
market economies to market economy status. See discussion in the text that follows. 
40 See Office of the United States Trade Representative (1994, p. 104) and Jackson (1989, p. 192). 
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NMEs are even more biased than those for market economies, and the NME market surge 
statute (Section 406) has a lower injury standard than Section 201. 
NME dumping cases are determined using the surrogate country constructed cost mea- 
surement, in which factor costs from one or more surrogate market economies are combined 
with factor proportions from the NME to construct an average cost measure. The law stipulates 
that in choosing the surrogate country, Commerce should, "to the extent possible," rely on 
"market economy countries that are at a level of economic development comparable to that of 
the nonmarket economy country, and significant producers of comparable merchandise" (Com- 
mittee on Ways and Means 1993, p. 389). Even a disinterested application of this methodology 
would be likely to produce dubious results. But the application of this statute has hardly been 
disinterested, and the results have often been farcical: Countries like the U.K. and Canada have 
been used as surrogates for China and Russia (Cass and Narkin 1991, p. 216). In a famous case 
involving Polish golf carts, Canada was chosen as a surrogate for Poland. But Canada had 
stopped producing golf carts before the investigation was completed. So after selecting Canada, 
the administering authority had to determine how much Polish golf carts would have cost in 
Canada if Canada had produced golf carts.41 
Nonmarket economies also have unique status under the countervailing duty and market 
surge laws. They are currently exempt from countervailing duty cases because the courts ruled- 
in the Georgetown Steel case-that it was impossible to determine the level of subsidies in the 
distorted price environment that obtains in NMEs. But it is unclear whether subsidies granted 
while a country holds NME status are countervailable once the country graduates to market 
economy status. If they are, this would represent a substantial disincentive to moving to market 
economy status. 
The market surge statute that applies exclusively to the NMEs, Section 406, is broadly 
similar to Section 201. But Section 406 has a lower injury standard (the surge in imports must 
be a "significant cause of material injury" rather than a "substantial cause of serious injury"), 
and remedies are applied only against imports from the NMEs, not against all countries (as 
under Section 201). 
4. The Uruguay Round 
Some of the most contentious battles of the Uruguay Round negotiations were waged over 
the unfair trade provisions. This section will briefly describe the relevant features of the Uruguay 
Round agreement.42 
In antidumping, the Uruguay Round agreement generally moves world antidumping sys- 
tems closer to U.S. procedures, though there are also some provisions that require changes in 
U.S. practice. Table 2 describes the more important changes in the U.S. laws. Examples of 
marginal improvements in the laws include the stipulations that profit and overhead calculations 
41 Technically, this case was adjudicated using a surrogate country price measure: Canada's golf cart price, rather than 
factor costs, was used to construct the foreign market value. But since Canada did not produce golf carts, the price 
had to be constructed. In effect, then, the only difference between the surrogate country price measure and the surrogate 
country constructed cost measure in this case was that Canada's factor proportions were used instead of Poland's. In 
an administrative review, the surrogate country was switched to Spain. 
42 For an overview of the results of the Uruguay Round and an introduction to the operations of the World Trade 
Organization, see Jackson (1994). 
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Table 2. The Uruguay Round and the U.S. Dumping Laws 
Issue Description of Issue Uruguay Round Changes Other Comments 
Sunset Reviews Dumping duties are Under previous There are some lin- 
intermittently re- statutes, duties gering concerns 
viewed. Never- had no definite over the stan- 
theless, many are duration. Under dards to be ap- 
perpetuated for the new legisla- plied during the 
extremely long tion, duties are sunset review 
periods of time. terminated five (e.g., the defini- 
A sunset review years after impo- tions of likely 
establishes the sition unless ter- and reasonably 
presumption of a mination would foreseeable). The 
limited duration be "likely to procedure ap- 
for duties. lead to continua- plied to existing 
tion or recur- duties (i.e., the 
rence of material timing and or- 
injury within a dering of their 
reasonably fore- reviews) is also 
seeable time." the subject of 
much interest to 
affected parties. 
Averaging Dumping margins Under previous The change applies 
could be calcu- statutes, compar- only to investi- 
lated by match- isons of individ- gations. The old 
ing individual ual prices in the (biased) transac- 
transactions in U.S. to average tion-to-average 
each market (a prices abroad bi- methodology 
transaction-to- ased dumping will continue to 
transaction ba- margins up- be used in re- 
sis), by compar- wards. Under the views of previ- 
ing averages in new legislation, ously imposed 
each market (an price compari- margins. There 
average-to-aver- sons of home is also an ex- 
age basis), or by market value and emption in the 
comparing indi- foreign market statutes permit- 
vidual transac- value will be ting the biased 
tions in the conducted on an methodology to 
home market to average-to-aver- be employed in 
an average for age or transac- investigations 
the foreign mar- tion-to- under exception- 
ket (a transac- transaction basis al conditions. 
tion-to-average in investigations. 
basis). This is 
the averaging is- 
sue. 
must use actual data whenever possible (although some mischief is still possible when trans- 
actions are judged to be outside the ordinary course of trade, which is potentially a major 
loophole); that price comparisons must be on a transaction-to-transaction or average-to-average 
basis (although only in investigations, not reviews, and there are some exceptions even for 
investigations); that orders must be terminated after five years (unless such a revocation is 
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Table 2. Continued 
Issue Description of Issue Uruguay Round Changes Other Comments 
Level of Price Comparisons be- The implementing 
Comparison tween prices of legislation may 
domestic sales have introduced 
and prices of some new biases 
foreign sales are into this process. 
skewed if the For example, un- 
sales occur at der the new 
different levels methodology, in- 
of trade (e.g., direct selling ex- 
wholesale vs. re- penses and prof- 
tail). Therefore, its will often be 
Commerce ad- subtracted from 
justs the prices the U.S. price 
to a common but not from the 
level of trade. equivalent for- 
eign price, there- 
by boosting the 
dumping margin. 
Calculation of Prof- When Commerce Under the previous The profit margin 
its and Overhead uses the con- statutes, Com- will be calculat- 
in Constructed structed cost in- merce imposed a ed only on sales 
Value dex as its mea- minimum profit "in the ordinary 
sure of foreign margin of 8% course of trade." 
market value, it (of total costs) This caveat 
adds overhead and a minimum could permit 
and a profit mar- overhead rate of Commerce to 
gin to its esti- 10% (of operat- disregard many 
mate of operat- ing costs). The sales below av- 
ing costs. new legislation erage total cost, 
directs Com- thereby inflating 
merce to use ac- the profit margin 
tual data (from and the dumping 
the firm or in- margin. 
dustry) to calcu- 
late these mar- 
gins, regardless 
of whether or 
not they are be- 
low the previous 
artificial mini- 
mums. 
"likely to lead to continuation or recurrence" of injury); and that evidence submitted by foreign 
exporters must be accepted and used (subject to some relatively weak requirements). While 
such changes represent a significant improvement in the law and do address some of the more 
egregious biases in the previous system, they nonetheless perpetuate the fundamental structure 
of the antidumping process, with its emphasis on preventing sales below average total cost. 
The Uruguay Round agreement also addresses subsidies, which it divides into three cate- 
gories: those that are prohibited (or so-called red light subsidies), those that are permitted unless 
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Table 2. Continued 
Issue Description of Issue Uruguay Round Changes Other Comments 
Startup Costs in Firms often incur Under the new Startup costs are 
Constructed large startup legislation, star- crucial in many 
Value costs in a new tup operations industries, es- 
operation. Such qualify for an pecially capital- 
costs should be adjustment to intensive ones. 
amortized over their production 
the life of the costs. Com- 
project. The is- merce is direct- 
sue is therefore ed to substitute 
how these costs "the unit pro- 
should be treated duction costs in- 
in calculating the curred with re- 
constructed cost spect to the 
index. merchandise at 
the end of the 
startup period 
for the unit pro- 
duction costs in- 
curred during 
the startup peri- 
od." 
Best Information If exporting firms Under previous There are lingering 
Available do not submit practice, infor- questions about 
adequate infor- mation require- the process for 
mation, Com- ments were diffi- verifying and 
merce bases its cult to fulfill and corroborating the 
conclusions on information from information sub- 
the "best infor- partially incom- mitted by parties 
mation avail- plete submis- to the case. 
able." Often this sions was often 
"best informa- completely disre- 
tion available" garded. The new 
is that submitted process address- 
by domestic es these short- 




small firms) and 
ensuring that any 
relevant informa- 
tion, even from 
partially incom- 
plete submis- 
sions, is used. 
they cause adverse trade effects (yellow light), and those that are permitted regardless of trade 
effects (green light). Red-light subsidies include export subsidies (both de jure and de facto) 
and subsidies contingent on local content requirements. Yellow-light subsidies are those not 
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Table 2. Continued 
Issue Description of Issue Uruguay Round Changes Other Comments 
De minimis If the calculated The new statutes 
Margins dumping margin impose a de 
is below some minimis margin 
de minimis of 2% in investi- 
threshold, Com- gations. The pre- 
merce concludes vious 0.5% mar- 
that no dumping gin is maintained 
has occurred. for reviews. 
Negligible Imports If the dumped im- Under previous There is an excep- 
ports are insignif- statutes, ITC de- tion to the 3% 
icant, ITC con- cided whether rule if dumping 
cludes that no the imports were cases are filed 
injury has oc- insignificant against exporters 
curred. based on their from many 
volume and mar- countries that 
ket share. The collectively ac- 
new statutes in- count for more 
troduce an im- than 7% of U.S. 
port share imports (even if 
threshold: If each one indi- 
imports from vidually ac- 
any particular counts for under 
country consti- 3% of U.S. im- 
tute less than 3% ports). In any 
of total U.S. im- case, import 
ports, they are shares above 3% 
deemed negligi- are not necessar- 
ble and the ily indicative of 
dumping case is a substantial 
dismissed. U.S. presence if 
total imports are 
an insignificant 
share of the U.S. 
market. 
a For completeness, an average-to-transaction basis is also possible (in which the average at home is compared to 
individual transactions abroad). But this is problematic conceptually: For example, if a single sale in the foreign market 
occurs at a price higher than the U.S. average, are all the U.S. sales dumped?? In any case, such a procedure is not 
used in practice. b The Uruguay Round implementing legislation has changed several parts of the terminology used in the U.S. statutes 
in order to bring them into conformance with the GATT 1994. In particular, "foreign market value" is now called 
"normal value." 
otherwise prohibited (under the red-light test) nor protected (under the green-light test) and are 
actionable only if they cause injury or serious prejudice to another country or somehow impair 
other trade provisions. Green-light subsidies include those not specific to particular enterprises 
or industries (that is, those that do not disproportionately benefit particular sectors), R&D sub- 
sidies (as long as the subsidies cover no more than 75% of the costs of industrial research or 
50% of the costs of precompetitive development activity), regional development subsidies (as 
long as they are granted to a region considered to be disadvantaged on the basis of certain given 
objective criteria), and environmental subsidies (as long as they are nonrecurring, limited to 
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20% of environmental adaptation costs, and available to all relevant firms).43 Subsidies found 
to contravene these rules can be disciplined by the new World Trade Organization (WTO) or 
countervailed by member countries. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Uruguay Round agreement institutes a much stronger dispute 
settlement procedure under the auspices of the WTO. Under the new process, a panel decision 
will be adopted unless there is a unanimous agreement not to adopt it (under the previous GATT 
dispute settlement process, a panel decision was only adopted if there was a unanimous agree- 
ment to adopt it). An approved WTO panel decision against a particular country will require 
either a change in the relevant practice or the granting of compensation to other WTO members. 
(Compensation usually means that the other WTO nations are allowed to withdraw previous 
tariff concessions, providing one of the few types of compensation that can harm both the donor 
and the recipient.) 
5. The Future: How Should We Improve Our Import Trade Laws? 
The Uruguay Round brings our trade laws slightly closer to the principles adduced in 
section 2. But there is still an obvious gap. In policy interventions, as in statistical testing, there 
are both Type I errors (intervening when we shouldn't) and Type II errors (not intervening 
when we should). Our import trade laws seem to have an unnecessarily strong bias toward Type 
I errors and thus are inconsistent with President Clinton's often-quoted exhortation that "we 
must compete, not retreat." It is generally acknowledged that the laws need to be reformed. 
Even the chairman of the ITC admits that "we all know these laws can be improved."44 
Because other countries are learning to mimic U.S. behavior, a more liberal set of import 
trade laws would bring indirect efficiency benefits-through less restrictive laws abroad-in 
addition to the direct effects (Congressional Budget Office 1994, p. 7). Indeed, U.S. exporters 
already face more antidumping cases than exporters from any other country (see Figure 2),45 
and any biases in our laws that protect our import-competing firms are likely to redound to the 
detriment of our exporters.46 And our most competitive exporters, the ones most likely to price 
below some given norm, are the ones most likely to be subjected to antidumping duties. Per- 
petuating unfair trade laws that are themselves unfair thus imposes substantial burdens on our 
consumers and on our most efficient exporters while protecting our least efficient import-com- 
peting firms. 
Even if the import trade laws are not liberalized, there is still a variety of ways to improve 
them. Our antidumping and countervailing duty laws are now used for a variety of purposes 
43 The traffic light rules are somewhat different for less developed countries. 
44 See Financial Times (10 August 1994). 
45 Figure 2 depicts the number of antidumping cases filed against exporters from the listed countries and reported to the 
GATT Committee on Antidumping Practices between January 1989 and June 1993. Only signatories to the antidumping 
code within the GATT are required to file such reports, and many countries (including many GATT Contracting Parties) 
are not signatories. In addition, some signatories (e.g., the European Union) do not report some cases filed against 
nonsignatories. The figures presented thus represent a lower bound on the total number of antidumping cases against 
the given countries. It is possible that the rankings for the total number of antidumping cases, filed by GATT and non- 
GATT signatories, would differ from the rankings given here. Source: Compilations based on GATT reports. 
46 The biases in our own laws vitiate our position in criticizing similar biases in other nations' laws. It seems highly 
unlikely that the U.S. government would file complaints with the WTO against other countries for effectively mimicking 
our laws. 
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Figure 2. Targets of Antidumping Cases, January 1989-June 1993 
for which they were not intended, while spurious accusations of unfairness obfuscate the real 
policy issues involved. Meanwhile, the domain of the laws is becoming ever more expansive. 
Trade attorneys, for example, sometimes argue that the antidumping laws must be used to 
combat foreign monopolies that restrict market access to U.S. firms, even though Section 301 
includes an explicit provision to address such problems.47 Basically, dumping has come to be 
defined as anything that can produce a positive dumping margin under the extant antidumping 
statutes. So even if changes are made only on a restrictiveness neutral basis, our system of trade 
laws could be more transparent and efficient if it functioned as it ostensibly should: with import 
surges handled under the import surge law, foreign anticompetitive practices handled under 
Section 301 (or in multilateral form), etc. 
What specific reforms would improve the system? Numerous scholars of the laws have 
put forward suggestions that range from the incremental to the momentous.48 Below I delineate 
one possible combination of these suggestions that would simplify the structure of the laws 
while moving us closer to the policy objectives advanced in section 2. As will become apparent, 
we do not necessarily abide by the restrictiveness neutral constraint. 
Before turning to the specific proposals, I note three general points. First, a crucial issue 
in considering reform of the import trade laws is the relevance of the new trade theory effects 
mentioned in section 2. Within the economics community, there continue to be reservations, 
mainly based on political economy arguments, about the practical benefits of policies predicated 
on the new trade theory.49 And any import trade law designed to capture the benefits suggested 
by the new trade theory seems prone to serious Type I errors: Numerous trade restrictions would 
undoubtedly be imposed when there are no rents to be captured or protected by the nation as 
a whole. My conclusion is that the precepts of the new trade theory are an important caveat 
and may be crucial in a limited number of specific cases, but attempts to exploit such effects 
within the import trade laws are likely to be both ineffective and costly. Second, any set of 
47 See Jackson (1989, p. 212). Section 301 includes in its definition of "unreasonable acts" the "toleration by a foreign 
government of systematic anticompetitive activities by private firms or among private firms in the foreign country that 
have the effect of restricting ... access of United States goods ...." 
48 See, for example, Jackson (1989, pp. 242-244), Boltuck and Litan (1991), Trebilcock (1990), Hart (1990), and es- 
pecially Finger (1993, Chapter 4). 
49 See, for example, Krugman (1987, 1994). Francois (1992, p. 185) concludes that, even in the presence of increasing 
returns, "on net optimal commercial policy may still best be approximated by free trade." 
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trade laws, regardless of how well the laws are formulated, is likely to induce wasteful rent- 
seeking behavior. Statutes offering even the possibility of protection inevitably engender rent- 
seeking activities that are both direct (e.g., lobbying) and indirect (e.g., manipulating output in 
order to make a positive injury finding more likely). Leidy (1994) describes the various ways 
in which such behavior manifests itself. We can only hope to minimize, not eliminate, such 
effects. Finally, although I do not explore the issue here, the inclusion of further improvements 
to our trade adjustment assistance programs could increase the political viability of any reform 
package while possibly yielding additional economic benefits. 
Antidumping 
The most extreme reform to the antidumping laws would be to merge them with our 
domestic predatory pricing laws. If predatory pricing is the primary policy concern raised by 
dumping (that is, if the weak form of predation is, in practice, unimportant), this suggestion 
seems to have substantial merit. 
Many of the problems involved in designing a good antidumping law are also faced in 
designing a good domestic competition law, including the difficulties of measuring marginal 
cost (as opposed to average cost), the treatment of costs for new operations (startup costs), the 
nexus between market barriers and the probability of successful predation, and the definition of 
the relevant market. It seems foolish and inefficient to struggle with these questions twice, once 
in our domestic antitrust laws and then again in the international dumping laws. Furthermore, 
for reasons of fairness and simplicity, a single set of predatory pricing laws (for both domestic 
and international cases) seems preferable. Such a change in our laws would mirror the increasing 
harmonization and unification of competition policies internationally. In customs unions and 
free trade areas like the European Union and the Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, for 
example, antidumping laws no longer apply to trade between member countries. Instead, com- 
petition law standards are used (Council of Economic Advisers 1994, p. 240). 
To be fair, there are some considerations that are specific to the international sphere. Ad- 
ditional complications in international cases include the problems of converting different cur- 
rencies into a common one (i.e., choosing which exchange rates to use),50 the rents accruing to 
foreign producers, the higher adjustment costs caused by the relative immobility of labor across 
national boundaries, and the possible involvement of sovereign foreign governments. But these 
difficulties are not intractable.5 
Other, less severe, reforms to the antidumping laws are also possible. For example, it would 
not be difficult to remove or attenuate some of the more egregious procedural problems (for 
example, the focus on price-to-cost comparisons) simply by passing new laws or reinterpreting 
extant laws. Discretion could be incorporated into the process by allowing the President to veto 
dumping duties (although I note that the current quasi-judicial system was developed in part to 
protect the President from the political pressures inevitably associated with any decision on 
dumping duties). A more comprehensive definition of injury is an especially promising possi- 
bility. Finger (1993), for example, has suggested that the injury test should scrutinize the effect 
50 This problem can actually arise in purely domestic antitrust cases, albeit in less severe form, if inputs are imported. 
51 We should note that merging the antidumping laws with the domestic competition laws would probably reduce rent- 
seeking activities but would not eliminate them: The antitrust laws have also induced much rent-seeking behavior. 
William Baumol (1993, pp. 78-82) provides an interesting set of examples, including the London Fuller's case of 1298. 
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on the national economy rather than the petitioning industry. "Antidumping would thus become 
public policy rather than private policy" (Finger 1993, p. 70). 
Countervailing Duty Laws 
In principle, such laws can be beneficial if they are carefully crafted and implemented. But 
they must no longer be used as a form of protection against market surges. A stricter injury 
test and a higher standard of proof for establishing the existence of subsidies would be helpful 
in this regard. Francois, Palmeter, and Anspacher (1991) present a detailed set of the "more 
obvious reforms that are needed" in the countervailing duty procedures, including the elimi- 
nation of hypocritical cases (that is, cases against practices also undertaken by the U.S. gov- 
ernment), changes in the methodology used to calculate subsidies, and a variety of other specific 
recommendations.52 The new World Trade Organization can play a useful role in promoting 
such reforms. 
Import Surge Laws 
Protection against market surges may be a legitimate feature of our trade law system, but 
such protection should probably not be conducted furtively through laws intended for other 
purposes. Most analysts agree that any surge protection should be transparent, undertaken only 
in the national economic interest, and betray no connotations of unfair trade. Section 201 seems 
largely to fulfill these requirements, although one critic has suggested some improvements (the 
title of his essay, "Throwing Deep: Trade Remedy Laws in a First-Best World," may betray 
the standard to which he is holding the surge law) (Trebilcock 1990, p. 249-250). Given the 
existing distortions in the import trade law system, the more urgent reforms surely involve the 
antidumping and countervailing duty laws. 
Section 337 
A separate set of laws to protect intellectual property rights violations during the importing 
process seems superfluous, at least to naive economists like ourselves. Can't all complaints 
about intellectual property rights be channeled through the corresponding domestic laws? In 
addition to parsimony and clarity, this would ensure that we are in full compliance with the 
1989 GATT ruling.53 
Nonmarket Economies 
The nonmarket economy procedures are widely recognized as severely biased and difficult 
to defend, especially since the sui generis nature of the economies in transition makes com- 
parisons with comparable market economies extraordinarily problematic. Both benevolence and 
hard-headed national interest, moreover, suggest that the reform process in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe should be supported. Open markets-"trade not aid"-seem the 
most auspicious and mutually beneficial means of providing such support. As Jeffrey Garten, 
the Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, has noted, "At present, most of the 
52 See Francois, Palmeter, and Anspacher (1991, pp. 130-133). 
53 According to officials in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Uruguay Round implementing legislation 
brings Section 337 into compliance with the GATT ruling. But it is not clear that a WTO panel would concur. 
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economies in transition are still considered non-market economies under the U.S. antidumping 
law. The United States believes that increased international trade is their best opportunity for 
development" (Garten 1994, p. 27-28). 
One comprehensive reform to the nonmarket economy import trade laws was proposed by 
the Clinton administration in the spring of 1994. Under the proposal, which is still under 
consideration, trade complaints against the economies in transition, primarily the states of the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, would be channeled through a new import surge law. 
The antidumping, countervailing duty, and Section 406 processes would be temporarily sus- 
pended for these countries. The injury standard under this new law would be higher than in the 
antidumping code but lower than in Section 201. The ITC would evaluate injury claims and 
submit recommended remedies to the President. A positive injury finding would require some 
corrective action by the President (albeit not necessarily the one suggested by the ITC). This 
proposal seems to represent a substantial improvement over current practice. 
6. Conclusion 
Abuse of import trade laws represents one of the most ominous threats to a liberal inter- 
national trading regime. There is a coherent argument for the existence of an extremely circum- 
scribed set of such laws, but our statutes seem to have become divorced from such principles. 
The Uruguay Round represents a step in the right direction, but only a small step. Economists 
can play a useful role by continuing to point out the weaknesses in our import trade laws to 
policymakers and the public, while also proposing and debating possible reforms to improve 
the functioning of the system. 
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